Climate change constitutes one of the most pressing challenges confronting society today. Without decisive measures, the repercussions of climate change will continue to escalate, exacerbating economic uncertainty, deepening social inequalities, and heightening social tensions (IPCC, 2023; Lynas et al., 2021; UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative & National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2021).
Despite clear scientific consensus on the human causes of climate change and the urgent need for mitigation (Cook et al., 2016; Lynas et al., 2021), public perceptions remain deeply divided on the urgency of climate action, especially along political lines (Knollenborg & Sommer, 2022; Sherman et al., 2021). In the European Union, climate action has become increasingly politicised (Schattschneider, 1960), with ideological beliefs influencing how individuals perceive the crisis and their role in addressing it (Marquardt & Lederer, 2022). Although an increasing body of research has documented cross-national differences in attitudes towards climate change and scepticism (Hornsey et al., 2018; Lewis et al., 2018; McCright et al., 2016), the impact of far-right political orientation on climate action remains underexplored. Furthermore, most studies focus only on specific personal climate-related behaviours, such as planting trees, making it difficult to generalise findings (Berkebile-Weinberg et al., 2024). This narrow scope risks overlooking broader patterns of engagement across the three main sectors responsible for the majority of personal greenhouse gas emissions: housing, transportation, and food consumption (Dubois et al., 2019). This research addresses these gaps by analysing how far-right political views influence personal climate action across the European Union, using a composite measure covering these three high-emission sectors. It also explores whether this relationship differs by gender and region within the EU.
Why do far-right political preferences lead to less personal climate actions?
Far-right political orientation has been consistently linked to lower engagement in climate action. Political identity theory suggests that individuals with a far-right political identity may reject climate action as a means of distancing themselves from ideologically opposing groups (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Huddy, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Moreover, system justification theory suggests that these individuals are more inclined to resist acknowledging climate change, as it indicates a necessity for structural change that conflicts with their preference for upholding existing systems (Feygina et al., 2010). Solution aversion theory highlights their opposition to government intervention in climate policy, as it conflicts with core values such as individual freedom (Campbell & Kay, 2014). Also, anti-environmental rhetoric tends to characterise climate concern as a sign of weakness or a lack of patriotism, a discourse internalised by both men and women with a far-right political orientation (Kaul & Buchanan, 2023). Finally, in Western EU countries where climate politics are highly polarised and closely tied to left-wing agendas, far-right citizens are particularly disengaged. Whereas in post-communist Eastern EU countries, where environmentalism has lower political salience, far-right individuals are less likely to perceive climate action as politically charged, resulting in smaller ideological gaps (McCright et al., 2016; Rohrschneider & Miles, 2015).
How does political identity shape personal climate action in the European Union?
Using multi-level regression analyses on data from the 2021 Eurobarometer 95.1 survey, which includes responses from over 26,000 citizens across all 27 EU member states (European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate Action, 2023), a consistent negative relationship is observed between far-right political orientation and personal climate action across the European Union. Individuals identifying with the political far-right were less likely to engage in everyday behaviours such as reducing meat consumption, recycling, or using alternatives to cars. This effect remained significant even after controlling for age, education, social class, survey mode, and real GDP per capita.
Interestingly, gender did not moderate this relationship: The effect of far-right political orientation on climate action was consistent across genders, indicating that political identity predicted lower engagement among both men and women to a similar degree. This aligns with Kaul and Buchanan (2023), who argue that the gender gap in climate action diminishes within right-wing populations.
This is because environmentalism is often politically framed as a left-wing or progressive cause, leading to both men and women on the right to distance themselves from it.
Moreover, this study found significant regional differences in the relationship between far-right political orientation and personal action on climate change. In Western EU countries, the gap between individuals who are politically far-right and those who are not was wide, reflecting the strong politicisation of climate issues. In post-communist EU countries, however, the relationship was weaker, suggesting that climate action is less closely tied to political identity where environmental debates have lower salience.
Implications
These findings carry significant implications, suggesting that climate action depends not just on resources or awareness but also on political identity. For far-right populations, climate-friendly behaviours may be resisted because they are framed as politically progressive. This suggests that inclusive communication strategies are needed, ones that avoid polarising terms like “climate change”. Moreover, gender-tailored campaigns may be less effective among far-right groups, since political identity appears to override gender differences. Finally, regional context matters: climate strategies must consider historical and political legacies, recognising that politicisation and salience differ sharply between Western and post-communist Europe.
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